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[840] BOOK III THE ARTS IN
EDUCATION (SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.) |
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[841] SUCH, then, I said,
are our principles of theology--some tales are to be told, and others are not to be told
to our disciples from their youth upward, if we mean them to honor the gods and their
parents, and to value friendship with one another. |
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[842] Yes; and I think that
our principles are right, he said. |
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[843] But if they are to be
courageous, must they not learn other lessons beside these, and lessons of such a kind as
will take away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in
him? |
|
[844] Certainly not, he
said. |
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[845] And can he be
fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who
believes the world below to be real and terrible? |
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[846] Impossible. |
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[847] Then we must assume a
control over the narrators of this class of tales as well as over the others, and beg them
not simply to revile, but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their
descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors. |
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[848] That will be our
duty, he said. |
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[849] Then, I said, we
shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses |
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[850] "I would rather
be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than rule over all the dead who have
come to naught." |
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[851] We must also expunge
the verse which tells us how Pluto feared |
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[852] "Lest the
mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen both of mortals and
immortals." |
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[853] And again: |
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[854] "O heavens!
verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but no mind at all!" |
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[855] Again of Tiresias: |
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[856] "[To him even
after death did Persephone grant mind,] that he alone should be wise; but the other souls
are flitting shades." |
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[857] Again: |
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[858] "The soul flying
from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamentng her fate, leaving manhood and youth." |
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[859] Again: |
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[860] "And the soul,
with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth." |
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[861] And, |
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[862] "As bats in
hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped out of the string and falls from
the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold
together as they moved." |
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[863] And we must beg Homer
and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these and similar passages, not
because they are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater
the poetical charm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are
meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death. |
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[864] Undoubtedly. |
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[865] Also we shall have to
reject all the terrible and appalling names which describe the world below--Cocytus and
Styx, ghosts under the earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very
mention causes a shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not
say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is a danger
that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them. |
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[866] There is a real
danger, he said. |
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[867] Then we must have no
more of them. |
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[868] True. |
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[869] Another and a nobler
strain must be composed and sung by us. |
|
[870] Clearly. |
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[871] And shall we proceed
to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men? |
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[872] They will go with the
rest. |
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[873] But shall we be right
in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that the good man will not consider
death terrible to any other good man who is his comrade. |
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[874] Yes; that is our
principle. |
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[875] And therefore he will
not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had suffered anything terrible? |
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[876] He will not. |
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[877] Such an one, as we
further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own happiness, and therefore is least
in need of other men. |
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[878] True, he said. |
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[879] And for this reason
the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men least
terrible. |
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[880] Assuredly. |
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[881] And therefore he will
be least likely to lament, and will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of
this sort which may befall him. |
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[882] Yes, he will feel
such a misfortune far less than another. |
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[883] Then we shall be
right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, and making them over to women (and
not even to women who are good for anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who
are being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like. |
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[884] That will be very
right. |
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[885] Then we will once
more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a
goddess, first lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face; then starting up
and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in
both his hands and pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the various modes
which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam, the kinsman of the gods, as
praying and beseeching, |
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[886] "Rolling in the
dirt, calling each man loudly by his name." |
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[887] Still more earnestly
will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the gods lamenting and saying, |
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[888] "Alas! my
misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow." |
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[889] But if he must
introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so completely to misrepresent the
greatest of the gods, as to make him say-- |
|
[890] "O heavens! with
my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased round and round the city, and my
heart is sorrowful." |
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[891] Or again: |
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[892] "Woe is me that
I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued at the hands of Patroclus the
son of Menoetius." |
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[893] For if, my sweet
Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy representations of the gods,
instead of laughing at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself,
being but a man, can be dishonored by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any
inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any
shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions. |
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[894] Yes, he said, that is
most true. |
|
[895] Yes, I replied; but
that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument has just proved to us; and by that
proof we must abide until it is disproved by a better. |
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[896] It ought not to be. |
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[897] Neither ought our
guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess
almost always produces a violent reaction. |
|
[898] So I believe. |
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[899] Then persons of
worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still
less must such a representation of the gods be allowed. |
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[900] Still less of the
gods, as you say, he replied. |
|
[901] Then we shall not
suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how |
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[902]
"Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus
bustling about the mansion." |
|
[903] On your views, we
must not admit them. |
|
[904] On my views, if you
like to father them on me; that we must not admit them is certain. |
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[905] Again, truth should
be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is useless to the gods, and useful only as
a medicine to men, then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians;
private individuals have no business with them. |
|
[906] Clearly not, he said. |
| Who gets to lie? For what purpose? |
[907] Then if anyone at all
is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and
they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to
lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and
although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to
be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to
speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for
a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the
crew, and how things are going with himself or his fellow-sailors. |
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[908] Most true, he said. |
|
[909] If, then, the ruler
catches anybody beside himself lying in the State, |
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[910] "Any of the
craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter," |
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[911] He will punish him
for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or State. |
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[912] Most certainly, he
said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out. |
|
[913] In the next place our
youth must be temperate? |
|
[914] Certainly. |
|
[915] Are not the chief
elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders and self-control in
sensual pleasures? |
|
[916] True. |
|
[917] Then we shall approve
such language as that of Diomede in Homer, |
|
[918] "Friend sit
still and obey my word," |
|
[919] and the verses which
follow, |
|
[920] "The Greeks
marched breathing prowess," |
|
[921] "...in silent
awe of their leaders." |
|
[922] and other sentiments
of the same kind. |
|
[923] We shall. |
|
[924] What of this line, |
|
[925] "O heavy with
wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag," |
|
[926] and of the words
which follow? Would you say that these, or any similar impertinences which private
individuals are supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well
or ill spoken? |
|
[927] They are ill spoken. |
|
[928] They may very
possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance. And therefore they
are likely to do harm to our young men--you would agree with me there? |
|
[929] Yes. |
|
[930] And then, again, to
make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than "When
the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries round wine which he
draws from the bowl and pours into the cups;" |
|
[931] is it fit or
conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? or the verse |
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[932] "The saddest of
fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger"? |
|
[933] What would you say
again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men were asleep and he the only
person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and
was so completely overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut,
but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state
of rapture before, even when they first met one another, |
|
[934] "Without the
knowledge of their parents" |
|
[935] or that other tale of
how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite? |
|
[936] Indeed, he said, I am
strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing. |
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[937] But any deeds of
endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they ought to see and hear; as, for
example, what is said in the verses, |
|
[938] "He smote his
breast, and thus reproached his heart, Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou
endured!" |
|
[939] Certainly, he said. |
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[940] In the next place, we
must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of money. |
|
[941] Certainly not. |
|
[942] Neither must we sing
to them of |
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[943] "Gifts
persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings." |
|
[944] Neither is Phoenix,
the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when
he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them; but that without
a gift he should not lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles
himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts, or that when he
had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that without payment he was
unwilling to do so. |
|
[945] Undoubtedly, he said,
these are not sentiments which can be approved. |
|
[946] Loving Homer as I do,
I hardly like to say that in attributing these feelings to Achilles, or in believing that
they are truly attributed to him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I
believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says, |
|
[947] "Thou hast
wronged me, O Far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily I would be even with thee, if
I had only the power;" |
|
[948] or his
insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands; or his
offerings to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, which had been previously dedicated to
the other river-god Spercheius, and that he actually performed this vow; or that he
dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre; of
all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to
believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the
gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at
one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by
avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men. |
|
[949] You are quite right,
he replied. |
|
[950] And let us equally
refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of Theseus, son of Poseidon, or of
Peirithous, son of Zeus, going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any
other hero or son of a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely
ascribe to them in our day: and let us further compel the poets to declare either that
these acts were done by them, or that they were not the sons of God; both in the same
breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to persuade our
youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than
men--sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious nor true, for we have already
proved that evil cannot come from the gods. |
|
[951] Assuredly not. And,
further, they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; for everybody will
begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always
being perpetrated by |
|
[952] "The kindred of
the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar, the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air
on the peak of Ida," |
|
[953] and who have |
|
[954] "the blood of
deities yet flowing in their veins." |
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[955] And therefore let us
put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of morals among the young. |
|
[956] By all means, he
replied. |
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[957] But now that we are
determining what classes of subjects are or are not to be spoken of, let us see whether
any have been omitted by us. The manner in which gods and demigods and heroes and the
world below should be treated has been already laid down. |
|
[958] Very true. |
|
[959] And what shall we say
about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject. |
|
[960] Clearly so. |
|
[961] But we are not in a
condition to answer this question at present, my friend. |
|
[962] Why not? |
|
[963] Because, if I am not
mistaken, we shall have to say that about men; poets and story-tellers are guilty of
making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and
the good miserable; and that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is
a man's own loss and another's gain--these things we shall forbid them to utter, and
command them to sing and say the opposite. |
|
[964] To be sure we shall,
he replied. |
|
[965] But if you admit that
I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you have implied the principle for which we
have been all along contending. |
|
[966] I grant the truth of
your inference. |
|
[967] That such things are
or are not to be said about men is a question which we cannot determine until we have
discovered what justice is, and how naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he
seem to be just or not. |
|
[968] Most true, he said. |
|
[969] Enough of the
subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when this has been considered, both
matter and manner will have been completely treated. |
|
[970] I do not understand
what you mean, said Adeimantus. |
|
[971] Then I must make you
understand; and perhaps I may be more intelligible if I put the matter in this way. You
are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry are a narration of events, either
past, present, or to come? Certainly, he replied. |
|
[972] And narration may be
either simple narration or imitation, or a union of the two? That, again, he said, I do
not quite understand. |
|
[973] I fear that I must be
a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty in making myself apprehended. Like a
bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece
off in illustration of my meaning. You know the first lines of the "Iliad," in
which the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that
Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon Chryses, failing of his object, invoked
the anger of the god against the Achaeans. Now as far as these lines, |
|
[974] "And he prayed
all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the chiefs of the people," |
|
[975] the poet is speaking
in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that he is anyone else. But in what
follows he takes the person of Chryses, and then he does all that he can to make us
believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double
form he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca
and throughout the "Odyssey." |
|
[976] Yes. |
|
[977] And a narrative it
remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from time to time and in the
intermediate passages? |
|
[978] Quite true. |
|
[979] But when the poet
speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he assimilates his style to that of
the person who, as he informs you, is going to speak? |
|
[980] Certainly. |
|
[981] And this assimilation
of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the
person whose character he assumes? |
|
[982] Of course. |
|
[983] Then in this case the
narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation? |
|
[984] Very true. |
|
[985] Or, if the poet
everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again the imitation is dropped, and
his poetry becomes simple narration. However, in order that I may make my meaning quite
clear, and that you may no more say, "I don't understand," I will show how the
change might be effected. If Homer had said, "The priest came, having his daughter's
ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the kings;" and then
if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he had continued in his own person, the
words would have been, not imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as
follows (I am no poet, and therefore I drop the metre): "The priest came and prayed
the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but
begged that they would give him back his daughter, and take the ransom which he brought,
and respect the god. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented.
But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the staff and
chaplets of the god should be of no avail to him--the daughter of Chryses should not be
released, he said--she should grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away
and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in
fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names,
reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building his
temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to
him, and that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god"--and so
on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative. |
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[986] I understand, he
said. |
|
[987] Or you may suppose
the opposite case--that the intermediate passages are omitted, and the dialogue only left. |
|
[988] That also, he said, I
understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy. |
|
[989] You have conceived my
meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you failed to apprehend before is now made
clear to you, that poetry and mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative--instances of
this are supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in which
the poet is the only speaker--of this the dithyramb affords the best example; and the
combination of both is found in epic and in several other styles of poetry. Do I take you
with me? |
|
[990] Yes, he said; I see
now what you meant. |
|
[991] I will ask you to
remember also what I began by saying, that we had done with the subject and might proceed
to the style. |
|
[992] Yes, I remember. |
|
[993] In saying this, I
intended to imply that we must come to an understanding about the mimetic art--whether the
poets, in narrating their stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether
in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all imitation be
prohibited? |
|
[994] You mean, I suspect,
to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our State? |
|
[995] Yes, I said; but
there may be more than this in question: I really do not know as yet, but whither the
argument may blow, thither we go. |
|
[996] And go we will, he
said. |
| What is the issue over imitation? |
[997] Then, Adeimantus, let
me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators; or rather, has not this question
been decided by the rule already laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and
not many; and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation
in any? |
|
[998] Certainly. |
|
[999] And this is equally
true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single
one? |
|
[1000] He cannot. |
|
[1001] Then the same
person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, and at the same time to be an
imitator and imitate many other parts as well; for even when two species of imitation are
nearly allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of
tragedy and comedy--did you not just now call them imitations? |
|
[1002] Yes, I did; and you
are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both. |
|
[1003] Any more than they
can be rhapsodists and actors at once? |
|
[1004] True. |
|
[1005] Neither are comic
and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are but imitations. |
|
[1006] They are so. |
|
[1007] And human nature,
Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of
imitating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are
copies. |
|
[1008] Quite true, he
replied. |
|
[1009] If then we adhere
to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians, setting aside every other
business, are to dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State,
making this their craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they
ought not to practise or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all, they should
imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their
profession--the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like; but they should not
depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from
imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how imitations,
beginning in early youth and continuing far into life, at length grow into habits and
become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind? |
|
[1010] Yes, certainly, he
said. |
|
[1011] Then, I said, we
will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of whom we say that they ought to be
good men, to imitate a woman, whether young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or
striving and vaunting against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in
affliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or
labor. |
|
[1012] Very right, he
said. |
|
[1013] Neither must they
represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of slaves? |
|
[1014] They must not. |
|
[1015] And surely not bad
men, whether cowards or any others, who do the reverse of what we have just been
prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in
any other manner sin against themselves and their neighbors in word or deed, as the manner
of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women
who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practised or
imitated. |
|
[1016] Very true, he
replied. |
|
[1017] Neither may they
imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains, or the like? |
|
[1018] How can they, he
said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the callings of any of these? |
|
[1019] Nor may they
imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers and roll of
the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing? |
|
[1020] Nay, he said, if
madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behavior of madmen. |
|
[1021] You mean, I said,
if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of narrative style which may be
employed by a truly good man when he has anything to say, and that another sort will be
used by a man of an opposite character and education. |
|
[1022] And which are these
two sorts? he asked. |
|
[1023] Suppose, I
answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration comes on some saying or
action of another good man--I should imagine that he will like to personate him, and will
not be ashamed of this sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the
good man when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he is overtaken by
illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when he comes to a
character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that; he will disdain such
a person, and will assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing
some good action; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never
practised, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels
the employment of such an art, unless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at
it. |
|
[1024] So I should expect,
he replied. |
|
[1025] Then he will adopt
a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style
will be both imitative and narrative; but there will be very little of the former, and a
great deal of the latter. Do you agree? |
|
[1026] Certainly, he said;
that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily take. |
|
[1027] But there is
another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the worse he is, the more
unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for him: and he will be ready to imitate
anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was
just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and
hail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, pipes,
trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or
crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there
will be very little narration. |
|
[1028] That, he said, will
be his mode of speaking. |
|
[1029] These, then, are
the two kinds of style? |
|
[1030] Yes. |
|
[1031] And you would agree
with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes; and if the
harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity, the result is that the speaker,
if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within
the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he will
make use of nearly the same rhythm? |
|
[1032] That is quite true,
he said. |
|
[1033] Whereas the other
requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, if the music and the style are
to correspond, because the style has all sorts of changes. |
|
[1034] That is also
perfectly true, he replied. |
|
[1035] And do not the two
styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry, and every form of expression in
words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together. |
|
[1036] They include all,
he said. |
|
[1037] And shall we
receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of the two unmixed styles? or
would you include the mixed? |
|
[1038] I should prefer
only to admit the pure imitator of virtue. |
|
[1039] Yes, I said,
Adeimantus; but the mixed style is also very charming: and indeed the pantomimic, which is
the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style with children and their
attendants, and with the world in general. |
|
[1040] I do not deny it. |
|
[1041] But I suppose you
would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State, in which human nature is not
twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only? |
|
[1042] Yes; quite
unsuitable. |
|
[1043] And this is the
reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a
shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also,
and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout? |
|
[1044] True, he said. |
|
[1045] And therefore when
any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything,
comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and
worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in
our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. And so when
we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send
him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and
severer poet or story-teller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will
follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our
soldiers. |
|
[1046] We certainly will,
he said, if we have the power. |
|
[1047] Then now, my
friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or
myth may be considered to be finished; for the matter and manner have both been discussed. |
|
[1048] I think so too, he
said. |
| What is the theme of the training in song
for the guardians? |
[1049] Next in order will
follow melody and song. |
|
[1050] That is obvious.
Everyone can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be consistent with
ourselves. |
|
[1051] I fear, said
Glaucon, laughing, that the word "everyone" hardly includes me, for I cannot at
the moment say what they should be; though I may guess. |
|
[1052] At any rate you can
tell that a song or ode has three parts-the words, the melody, and the rhythm; that degree
of knowledge I may presuppose? |
|
[1053] Yes, he said; so
much as that you may. |
|
[1054] And as for the
words, there will surely be no difference between words which are and which are not set to
music; both will conform to the same laws, and these have been already determined by us? |
|
[1055] Yes. |
|
[1056] And the melody and
rhythm will depend upon the words? |
|
[1057] Certainly. |
|
[1058] We were saying,
when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need of lamentation and strains of
sorrow? |
|
[1059] True. |
|
[1060] And which are the
harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and can tell me. |
|
[1061] The harmonies which
you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the full-toned or bass Lydian, and such like. |
|
[1062] These then, I said,
must be banished; they are of no use, even to women who have a character to maintain, and
much less to men. Certainly. |
|
[1063] In the next place,
drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our
guardians. |
|
[1064] Utterly unbecoming. |
|
[1065] And which are the
soft or drinking harmonies? |
|
[1066] The Ionian, he
replied, and the Lydian; they are termed "relaxed." |
|
[1067] Well, and are these
of any military use? |
|
[1068] Quite the reverse,
he replied; and if so, the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left. |
|
[1069] I answered: Of the
harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one warlike, to sound the note or accent
which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is
failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at
every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure;
and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no
pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction
and admonition, or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to
persuasion or entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by prudent conduct he
has attained his end, not carried away by his success, but acting moderately and wisely
under the circumstances, and acquiescing in the event. These two harmonies I ask you to
leave; the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate
and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance;
these, I say, leave. And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which
I was just now speaking. |
|
[1070] Then, I said, if
these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want
multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale? |
|
[1071] I suppose not. |
|
[1072] Then we shall not
maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and complex scales, or the makers of
any other manystringed, curiously harmonized instruments? |
|
[1073] Certainly not. |
|
[1074] But what do you say
to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit them into our State when you reflect
that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments
put together; even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute? |
|
[1075] Clearly not. |
|
[1076] There remain then
only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the shepherds may have a pipe in the
country. |
|
[1077] That is surely the
conclusion to be drawn from the argument. |
|
[1078] The preferring of
Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange, I said. |
|
[1079] Not at all, he
replied. |
|
[1080] And so, by the dog
of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the State, which not long ago we termed
luxurious. |
|
[1081] And we have done
wisely, he replied. |
|
[1082] Then let us now
finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow,
and they should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems
of metre, or metres of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions
of a courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found them, we shall adapt the foot
and the melody to words having a like spirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To say
what these rhythms are will be your duty--you must teach me them, as you have already
taught me the harmonies. |
|
[1083] But, indeed, he
replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are some three principles of rhythm out
of which metrical systems are framed, just as in sounds there are four notes out of which
all the harmonies are composed; that is an observation which I have made. But of what sort
of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say. |
|
[1084] Then, I said, we
must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of
meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for
the expression of opposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of
his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he arranged them in
some manner which I do not quite understand, making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall
of the foot, long and short alternating; and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic
as well as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities. Also in
some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the
rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These
matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the
analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know? |
|
[1085] Rather so, I should
say. |
|
[1086] But there is no
difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad
rhythm. |
|
[1087] None at all. |
|
[1088] And also that good
and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style; and that harmony and discord
in like manner follow style; for our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by
the words, and not the words by them. |
|
[1089] Just so, he said,
they should follow the words. |
|
[1090] And will not the
words and the character of the style depend on the temper of the soul? |
|
[1091] Yes. |
|
[1092] And everything else
on the style? |
|
[1093] Yes. |
|
[1094] Then beauty of
style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity--I mean the true
simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character, not that other simplicity
which is only an euphemism for folly? |
|
[1095] Very true, he
replied. |
|
[1096] And if our youth
are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonies their
perpetual aim? |
|
[1097] They must. |
|
[1098] And surely the art
of the painter and every other creative and constructive art are full of them--weaving,
embroidery, architecture, and every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and
vegetable--in all of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord
and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill-words and ill-nature, as grace and
harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness. |
|
[1099] That is quite true,
he said. |
|
[1100] But shall our
superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the
image of the good in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our
State? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be
prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and
indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot
conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in our State, lest
the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up
amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon
many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a
festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are
gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell
in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and
beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving
breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness
and sympathy with the beauty of reason. |
|
[1101] There can be no
nobler training than that, he replied. |
|
[1102] And therefore, I
said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm
and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily
fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or
of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received this true
education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and
nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his
soul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in
the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason
comes he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long
familiar. |
|
[1103] Yes, he said, I
quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be trained in music and on the
grounds which you mention. |
|
[1104] Just as in learning
to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the letters of the alphabet, which are
very few, in all their recurring sizes and combinations; not slighting them as unimportant
whether they occupy a space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and not
thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognize them wherever they are
found: True-- |
|
[1105] Or, as we recognize
the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror, only when we know the letters
themselves; the same art and study giving us the knowledge of both: Exactly-- |
|
[1106] Even so, as I
maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to educate, can ever become musical
until we and they know the essential forms of temperance, courage, liberality,
magnificence, and their kindred, as well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations,
and can recognize them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting them either
in small things or great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one art and
study. |
|
[1107] Most assuredly. |
|
[1108] And when a
beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mould, that
will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to see it? |
|
[1109] The fairest indeed. |
|
[1110] And the fairest is
also the loveliest? |
|
[1111] That may be
assumed. |
| What is Platonic love? How are the
guardians allowed to love? Why? |
[1112] And the man who has
the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest; but he will not love him
who is of an inharmonious soul? That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his
soul; but if there be any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it, and
will love all the same. |
|
[1113] I perceive, I said,
that you have or have had experiences of this sort, and I agree. But let me ask you
another question: Has excess of pleasure any affinity to temperance? |
|
[1114] How can that be? he
replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain. |
|
[1115] Or any affinity to
virtue in general? |
|
[1116] None whatever. |
|
[1117] Any affinity to
wantonness and intemperance? |
|
[1118] Yes, the greatest. |
|
[1119] And is there any
greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love? |
|
[1120] No, nor a madder. |
|
[1121] Whereas true love
is a love of beauty and order--temperate and harmonious? |
|
[1122] Quite true, he
said. |
|
[1123] Then no
intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love? |
|
[1124] Certainly not. |
|
[1125] Then mad or
intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the lover and his beloved; neither
of them can have any part in it if their love is of the right sort? |
|
[1126] No, indeed,
Socrates, it must never come near them. |
|
[1127] Then I suppose that
in the city which we are founding you would make a law to the effect that a friend should
use no other familiarity to his love than a father would use to his son, and then only for
a noble purpose, and he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to limit him
in all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going further, or, if he exceeds, he is
to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste. |
|
[1128] I quite agree, he
said. |
|
[1129] Thus much of music,
which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty? |
|
[1130] I agree, he said. |
|
[1131] After music comes
gymnastics, in which our youth are next to be trained. |
| What kind of physical training will the
guardians receive? What kind of lifestyle will they have? |
[1132] Certainly.
Gymnastics as well as music should begin in early years; the training in it should be
careful and should continue through life. Now my belief is--and this is a matter upon
which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation of my own, but my own belief
is--not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the
contrary, that the good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may
be possible. What do you say? |
|
[1133] Yes, I agree. |
|
[1134] Then, to the mind
when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing over the more particular care of the
body; and in order to avoid prolixity we will now only give the general outlines of the
subject. |
|
[1135] Very good. |
|
[1136] That they must
abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us; for of all persons a guardian
should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is. |
|
[1137] Yes, he said; that
a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him is ridiculous indeed. |
|
[1138] But next, what
shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for the great contest of all--are
they not? |
|
[1139] Yes, he said. |
|
[1140] And will the habit
of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them? |
|
[1141] Why not? |
|
[1142] I am afraid, I
said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy sort of thing, and rather
perilous to health. Do you not observe that these athletes sleep away their lives, and are
liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their
customary regimen? |
|
[1143] Yes, I do. |
|
[1144] Then, I said, a
finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes, who are to be like
wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost keenness; amid the many changes of water
and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a
campaign, they must not be liable to break down in health. |
|
[1145] That is my view. |
|
[1146] The really
excellent gymnastics is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now
describing. |
|
[1147] How so? |
|
[1148] Why, I conceive
that there is a gymnastics which, like our music, is simple and good; and especially the
military gymnastics. |
|
[1149] What do you mean? |
| Why must they only roast their meat? |
[1150] My meaning may be
learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at their feasts, when they are
campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no fish, although they are on the shores of the
Hellespont, and they are not allowed boiled meats, but only roast, which is the food most
convenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving
the trouble of carrying about pots and pans. |
|
[1151] True. |
|
[1152] And I can hardly be
mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them,
however, he is not singular; all professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to
be in good condition should take nothing of the kind. |
|
[1153] Yes, he said; and
knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them. |
|
[1154] Then you would not
approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of Sicilian cookery? |
|
[1155] I think not. |
|
[1156] Nor, if a man is to
be in condition, would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend? |
|
[1157] Certainly not. |
|
[1158] Neither would you
approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of Athenian confectionery? |
|
[1159] Certainly not. |
|
[1160] All such feeding
and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and song composed in the panharmonic
style, and in all the rhythms. Exactly. |
|
[1161] There complexity
engendered license, and here disease; whereas simplicity in music was the parent of
temperance in the soul; and simplicity in gymnastics of health in the body. |
|
[1162] Most true, he said. |
| What do lawyers and doctors signify about
the health of the state? |
[1163] But when
intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of justice and medicine are always
being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how
keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them. |
|
[1164] Of course. |
|
[1165] And yet what
greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education than this, that not
only artisans and the meaner sort of people need the skill of first-rate physicians and
judges, but also those who would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not
disgraceful, and a great sign of the want of good-breeding, that a man should have to go
abroad for his law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore
surrender himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges over him? |
|
[1166] Of all things, he
said, the most disgraceful. |
|
[1167] Would you say
"most," I replied, when you consider that there is a further stage of the evil
in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing all his days in the courts,
either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on
his litigiousness; he imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to take every
crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out
of the way of justice: and all for what?--in order to gain small points not worth
mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping
judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful? |
|
[1168] Yes, he said, that
is still more disgraceful. |
|
[1169] Well, I said, and
to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of an
epidemic, but just because, by indolence and a habit of life such as we have been
describing, men fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh,
compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as
flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace? |
|
[1170] Yes, he said, they
do certainly give very strange and newfangled names to diseases. |
|
[1171] Yes, I said, and I
do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days of Asclepius; and this I
infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer,
drinks a posset of Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese,
which are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the Trojan war
do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his
case. |
|
[1172] Well, he said, that
was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person in his condition. |
|
[1173] Not so
extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, as is commonly said,
before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did not practise our present system
of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and
himself of a sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found out a
way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world. |
|
[1174] How was that? he
said. |
|
[1175] By the invention of
lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery
was out of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do
nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in
anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on
to old age. |
|
[1176] A rare reward of
his skill! |
|
[1177] Yes, I said; a
reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood that, if Asclepius did not
instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose, not from ignorance or
inexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered
States every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no
leisure to spend in continually being ill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but,
ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort. |
|
[1178] How do you mean? he
said. |
|
[1179] I mean this: When a
carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure; an emetic or a purge or
a cautery or the knife--these are his remedies. And if someone prescribes for him a course
of dietetics, and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of
thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a
life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary employment; and
therefore bidding good-by to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary habits, and
either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies
and has no more trouble. |
|
[1180] Yes, he said, and a
man in his condition of life ought to use the art of medicine thus far only. |
|
[1181] Has he not, I said,
an occupation; and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his
occupation? |
|
[1182] Quite true, he
said. |
|
[1183] But with the rich
man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has any specially appointed work which
he must perform, if he would live. |
|
[1184] He is generally
supposed to have nothing to do. |
|
[1185] Then you never
heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should
practise virtue? |
|
[1186] Nay, he said, I
think that he had better begin somewhat sooner. |
|
[1187] Let us not have a
dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask ourselves: Is the practise of virtue
obligatory on the rich man, or can he live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let
us raise a further question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to
the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally
stand in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides? |
|
[1188] Of that, he
replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the body, when carried beyond the
rules of gymnastics, is most inimical to the practice of virtue. |
|
[1189] Yes, indeed, I
replied, and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of
state; and, what is most Important of all, irreconcileable with any kind of study or
thought or self-reflection--there is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are
to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practising or making trial of virtue in the
higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying that he is being made
ill, and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body. |
|
[1190] Yes, likely enough. |
|
[1191] And therefore our
politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons
who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment;
such as these he cured by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein
consulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and
through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and
infusion: he did not want to lengthen out good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers
begetting weaker sons;--if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no
business to cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use either to himself, or to
the State. |
|
[1192] Then, he said, you
regard Asclepius as a statesman. |
|
[1193] Clearly; and his
character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that they were heroes in the days of
old and practised the medicines of which I am speaking at the siege of Troy: You will
remember how, when Pandarus wounded Menelaus, they |
|
[1194] "Sucked the
blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies," |
|
[1195] But they never
prescribed what the patient was afterward to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any
more than in the case of Eurypylus; the remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal
any man who before he was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits; and even though
he did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they
would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no
use either to themselves or others; the art of medicine was not designed for their good,
and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend
them. |
|
[1196] They were very
acute persons, those sons of Asclepius. |
|
[1197] Naturally so, I
replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar disobeying our behests, although they
acknowledge that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing
a rich man who was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning.
But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us, will not believe them
when they tell us both; if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not
avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god. |
| How will the best doctors and judges come
by their knowledge? |
[1198] All that, Socrates,
is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you: Ought there not to be good
physicians in a State, and are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of
constitutions, good and bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are
acquainted with all sorts of moral natures? Yes, I said, I too would have good judges and
good physicians. But do you know whom I think good? |
|
[1199] Will you tell me? |
|
[1200] I will, if I can.
Let me, however, note that in the same question you join two things which are not the
same. |
|
[1201] How so? he asked.
Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skilful physicians are those
who, from their youth upward, have combined with the knowledge of their art the greatest
experience of disease; they had better not be robust in health, and should have had all
manner of diseases in their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the
instrument with which they cure the body; in that case we could not allow them ever to be
or to have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which has
become and is sick can cure nothing. |
|
[1202] That is very true,
he said. |
|
[1203] But with the judge
it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he ought not therefore to have been
trained among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from youth upward, and to
have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the
crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness; the
honorable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had no experience or
contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men
often appear to be simple, and are easily practised upon by the dishonest, because they
have no examples of what evil is in their own souls. |
|
[1204] Yes, he said, they
are far too apt to be deceived. |
|
[1205] Therefore, I said,
the judge should not be young; he should have learned to know evil, not from his own soul,
but from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others: knowledge should be
his guide, not personal experience. |
|
[1206] Yes, he said, that
is the ideal of a judge. |
|
[1207] Yes, I replied, and
he will be a good man (which is my answer to your question); for he is good who has a good
soul. But the cunning and suspicious nature of which we spoke-he who has committed many
crimes, and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness--when he is among his fellows, is
wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges of them by himself: but
when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears
to be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicions; he cannot recognize an honest
man, because he has no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time, as the bad are
more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself, and is by
others thought to be, rather wise than foolish. |
|
[1208] Most true, he said. |
|
[1209] Then the good and
wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the other; for vice cannot know virtue
too, but a virtuous nature, educated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and
vice: the virtuous, and not the vicious, man has wisdom--in my opinion. |
|
[1210] And in mine also. |
|
[1211] This is the sort of
medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will sanction in your State. They will
minister to better natures, giving health both of soul and of body; but those who are
diseased in their bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they
will put an end to themselves. |
|
[1212] That is clearly the
best thing both for the patients and for the State. |
|
[1213] And thus our youth,
having been educated only in that simple music which, as we said, inspires temperance,
will be reluctant to go to law. |
|
[1214] Clearly. |
|
[1215] And the musician,
who, keeping to the same track, is content to practise the simple gymnastics, will have
nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme case. |
|
[1216] That I quite
believe. |
|
[1217] The very exercises
and toils which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element of his nature,
and not to increase his strength; he will not, like common athletes, use exercise and
regimen to develop his muscles. |
|
[1218] Very right, he
said. |
|
[1219] Neither are the two
arts of music and gymnastics really designed, as is often supposed, the one for the
training of the soul, the other for the training of the body. |
|
[1220] What then is the
real object of them? |
|
[1221] I believe, I said,
that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul. |
|
[1222] How can that be? he
asked. |
|
[1223] Did you never
observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive devotion to gymnastics, or the
opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music? |
|
[1224] In what way shown?
he said. |
|
[1225] The one producing a
temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of softness and effeminacy, I replied. |
|
[1226] Yes, he said, I am
quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and that the mere musician
is melted and softened beyond what is good for him. |
|
[1227] Yet surely, I said,
this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly educated, would give courage, but,
if too much intensified, is liable to become hard and brutal. |
|
[1228] That I quite think. |
| How is the philosopher described? |
[1229] On the other hand
the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. And this also, when too much
indulged, will turn to softness, but, if educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate. |
|
[1230] True. |
|
[1231] And in our opinion
the guardians ought to have both these qualities? |
|
[1232] Assuredly. |
|
[1233] And both should be
in harmony? |
|
[1234] Beyond question. |
|
[1235] And the harmonious
soul is both temperate and courageous? |
|
[1236] Yes. |
|
[1237] And the
inharmonious is cowardly and boorish? |
|
[1238] Very true. |
|
[1239] And, when a man
allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through the funnel of his ears
those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking, and his whole
life is passed in warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the
passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of
brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and soothing process, in the next
stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the
sinews of his soul; and he becomes a feeble warrior. |
|
[1240] Very true. |
|
[1241] If the element of
spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily accomplished, but if he have a good
deal, then the power of music weakening the spirit renders him excitable; on the least
provocation he flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit
he grows irritable and passionate and is quite impractical. |
|
[1242] Exactly. |
|
[1243] And so in
gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder, and the reverse of a
great student of music and philosophy, at first the high condition of his body fills him
with pride and spirit, and he becomes twice the man that he was. |
|
[1244] Certainly. |
|
[1245] And what happens?
if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the muses, does not even that
intelligence which there may be in him, having no taste of any sort of learning or inquiry
or thought or culture, grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or
receiving nourishment, and his senses not being purged of their mists? |
|
[1246] True, he said. |
|
[1247] And he ends by
becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion--he is
like a wild beast, all violence and fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he
lives in all ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace. |
|
[1248] That is quite true,
he said. |
|
[1249] And as there are
two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the other the philosophical, some
god, as I should say, has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to
the soul and body), in order that these two principles (like the strings of an instrument)
may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized. |
|
[1250] That appears to be
the intention. |
|
[1251] And he who mingles
music with gymnastics in the fairest proportions, and best attempers them to the soul, may
be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of
the strings. |
|
[1252] You are quite
right, Socrates. |
|
[1253] And such a
presiding genius will be always required in our State if the government is to last. |
|
[1254] Yes, he will be
absolutely necessary. |
|
[1255] Such, then, are our
principles of nurture and education: Where would be the use of going into further details
about the dances of our citizens, or about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and
equestrian contests? For these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we
shall have no difficulty in discovering them. |
|
[1256] I dare say that
there will be no difficulty. |
|
[1257] Very good, I said;
then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects? |
|
[1258] Certainly. |
|
[1259] There can be no
doubt that the elder must rule the younger. |
|
[1260] Clearly. |
|
[1261] And that the best
of these must rule. |
|
[1262] That is also clear. |
|
[1263] Now, are not the
best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry? |
|
[1264] Yes. |
|
[1265] And as we are to
have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be those who have most the
character of guardians? |
|
[1266] Yes. |
|
[1267] And to this end
they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care of the State? |
|
[1268] True. |
|
|